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Why do Healthcare Organizations Choose to Violate Information Technology
Privacy Regulations? Proposing the Selective Information Privacy Violations in
Healthcare Organizations Model (SIPVHOM)

ABSTRACT
Privacy concerns about protected healthcare information (PHI) are rampant because of
the ease of access to PHI from the advent of Healthcare IT (HIT) and its exploding use.
Continual negative cases in the popular attest to the fact that current privacy regulations are
failing to keep PHI sufficiently secure in the climate of increate HIT use. To address these
issues, this paper proposes a theoretical model with testable hypotheses to explain and
predict organizational IT privacy violations in the healthcare industry. Our model, the
Selective Information Privacy Violations in Healthcare Organizations Model (SIPVHOM),
explains how organizational structures and processes and characteristics of regulatory
environments alter perceptions of risk and thereby the likelihood of rule violations. Finally,
based on SIPVHOM, we offer recommendations for the structuring of regulatory
environments and organizational structures to decrease abuse of PHI.
INTRODUCTION
Since the 1970’s, privacy laws have become increasingly prevalent in many areas of
society. Beginning with the Fair Credit Reporting Act in 1971, other privacy laws such as the
Family Education Rights and Privacy Act soon followed. With the advent of the Internet and
the associated ease of distributing information, laws particular to protect privacy during the
use of Information Systems (IS) have also emerged. Examples include the Children’s
Online Privacy Protection Act, and more recently, the Health Information Technology for
Economic and Clinical Health (HITECH) Act. Our research concerns this latter act (and
1
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related acts worldwide), which is an extension of the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act (HIPAA). The US Congress enacted HIPAA in 1996 to protect patients’
medical information—known as Protected Health Information (PHI)—from discrimination or
other forms of damaging use. Subtitle D of the HITECH Act extended the enforcement rules
of HIPAA to provide for stronger enforcement.
Despite the establishment of these medical privacy laws, data breaches cost the US
healthcare industry $6 billion each year (Horowitz, 2010). Similarly, the Department of
Health and Human Services (HHS)—the office in charge of monitoring compliance with
HIPAA rules—receives nearly ten-thousand complaints about privacy violations each year.
Not all of these complaints are IT-related and only 20 to 30 percent of the complaints
require corrective action—with the majority of the remaining complaints being resolved
before HHS begins an investigation (USDH&HS, 2011b). However, the cost of data
breaches in the healthcare industry and the number of valid HIPAA complaints show a need
for improvement in both technical and organizational compliance measures. The need for
improvement is a particularly pressing problem considering the massive growth in the
healthcare information technology (HIT) market.
Although the healthcare industry has been slow to adopt IS technology
(Bhattacherjee et al., 2007; Connell & Young, 2007), in recent years, HIT has proven
essential to the industry (Rivard et al., 2011). The 2010 Healthcare Information and
Management Systems Society (HIMSS) Security Survey suggests that approximately 85
percent of healthcare organizations in the US now share PHI electronically (HIMSS, 2010).
Similarly, growth in the adoption of HIT and the associated expenditures is explosive.
Currently, $80 billion is spent annually in the US on HIT, and the HIT market in the US is
expected to grow at a compound annual growth rate of 24 percent during 2012-2014
2
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(RNCOS, 2011c). Similar growth is expected in other countries as well, with Russia’s
compound annual growth rate expected to be 17% during 2010-2014 (RNCOS, 2011b) and
Australia’s compound annual growth rate expected to be 5.2% during 2010-2012 (RNCOS,
2011a). With the proliferation of HIT worldwide, it will be ever more important to gain and
maintain control over IT privacy violations.
To help control the growing problem of healthcare IT privacy violations, it is
important to understand the many facets that contribute to the problem. The lens of this
paper is organizational, as determined by people working in healthcare organization. We
focus our attention on the selectivity in organizational rule violations—particularly IT privacy
violations related to healthcare privacy laws such as HIPAA. Organizational rule violations
are deviations from appropriate conduct, as prescribed by laws and regulations, by
organizational members working individually or as groups acting in their organizational roles
to accomplish organizational goals (Vaughan, 1996). As suggested by Selectivity Theory
(Lehman & Ramanujam, 2009), organizations are selective in the rules that they violate.
That is, different organizations violate different rules, and do so at different times while
adhering to other rules. Selectivity Theory further suggests that attributes of the
organization and regulatory environment affect perceptions of risk, and thereby the
likelihood that a rule will be selected for violation. In this paper, we extend Selectivity Theory
to explain and predict the selectivity in organizational violations of IT medical privacy laws.
A review on our phenomenon of interest in recent IS research shows that
organizational violations—specifically those involving IT privacy regulations—are of
increasing concern. Worldwide, many countries have implemented legislation similar to the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act to prevent organizational violations such as financial reporting errors
(Leon et al., 2010). In terms of organizational privacy violations, many employers keep
3
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personal health records of their employees (Burkhard et al., 2010) to share this information
on a “national health information network” (Ozdemir et al., 2011), which increases potential
for abuse of IT privacy regulations during information exchange. Personal health records
are also stored on record systems owned by other agents independent of hospitals and
clinics to facilitate the flow of records between hospitals, clinics, and other entities in the
medical industry (Ozdemir et al., 2011). However, clinical staff may be prone to IS
avoidance and choose not to use these systems (Kane & Labianca, 2011).
Recent studies show that although training of healthcare staff helps to reduce
medical errors (Aron et al., 2011); problems still arise pertaining to patient records.
Nevertheless, Warkentin et al. (2011) show that employee compliance with medical privacy
laws can be improved through informal learning structures. They suggest that organizational
support, feedback on privacy compliance, and opportunities to observe compliance
activities built into informal learning structures can increase employee compliance with
privacy rules such as HIPAA. Similarly, Johnston and Warkentin (2008) show that
organizational support affects both an employee’s behavioral intent to comply with medical
privacy laws and the employee’s self-efficacy in complying with the laws. They also show
that employees of publicly owned medical institutions are more likely to perceive that the
organization is supporting compliance efforts and experience self-efficacy to comply.
Research has also shown how willing, or unwilling, patients are to disclose personal
information for use in their digital records because of their concern for privacy (Anderson &
Agarwal, 2011). We address this concern of organizational IT privacy violations.
This paper adds several important contributions to the literature on medical privacy
laws, privacy violations, and organizational rule violations in general. Much research has
been done in terms of individuals violating regulations (e.g., Atwater et al., 2001; D'Arcy et
4
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al., 2009; Gerlach et al., 2009; Siponen & Vance, 2010). However, organization-level
studies in this context are rare. This gap in the literature has led to calls for more
organizational-level and multilevel research in IS security and privacy topics {Belanger,
2012 #263}. Our goal thus is to start to fill the knowledge gap what causes organizations to
violate regulations—specifically those relating to IT privacy. Our purpose is to extend
Selectivity Theory (Lehman & Ramanujam, 2009) to explain and predict why organizations
violate IT privacy regulations.
To address this goal, we proceed as follows. First, we outline Selectivity Theory and
its several assumptions and constraints. Second, we demonstrate how healthcare
organizations and HIPAA fit within the assumptions and constraints of Selectivity Theory.
Third, we outline a theoretical model by adopting Selectivity Theory’s propositions and
further operationalize each proposition specific to the domain of IT privacy violations in the
healthcare industry. Finally, we offer a discussion of our theoretical model and propose a
series of measurement items that could be useful for future model testing.
REVIEWING FOUNDATIONAL THEORETICAL MODEL: SELECTIVITY THEORY
In this section, we propose a theoretical model that can explain and predict violations
of medical privacy laws, particularly IT-related privacy violations. We name our model the
Selective Information Privacy Violations in Healthcare Organizations Model (SIPVHOM).
Although we use HIPAA as a proxy for purposes of consistency and clarity, SIPVHOM
should also hold predictive power in determining compliance with other medical privacy
laws and explain possible differences in compliance between privacy laws. Further,
SIPVHOM has the potential to explain and predict differences in compliance between rules
contained under the same law. Because HIPAA consists of multiple rules, researchers can
use SIPVHOM to explain why some rules under HIPAA are more likely violated than others.
5
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Ultimately, SIPVHOM should inform the creation of privacy laws, and the structuring of the
associated regulatory environments and organizations that must abide by the laws.
We based SIPVHOM primarily on Selectivity Theory, proposed by Lehman and
Ramanujam (2009). Selectivity Theory explains and predicts why organizations selectively
violate some rules while complying with others. As will be shown in the following pages,
Selectivity Theory is a natural fit to describe and predict IT privacy violations in the
healthcare industry.
OVERVIEW OF SELECTIVITY IN RULE VIOLATIONS
Selectivity Theory posits that organizations are selective in the rules they violate
(Lehman & Ramanujam, 2009). Selectivity Theory suggests that a series of contextual
conditions and rule characteristics alter the likelihood of an organization selecting a rule for
violation. When referring to contextual conditions in Selectivity Theory, we mean attributes
of an organization—such as hierarchical structures or the complexity of business
processes—that can influence rule violations. Likewise, rule characteristics refer to the
attributes of a rule or the regulatory environment, such as the phrasing and framing of a rule
or the power of regulatory agencies that have sway over organizational behaviors. The
contextual conditions presented in Selectivity Theory include structural secrecy and the
coupling between prior violations and the associated outcomes—referred to as violation
coupling. Rule enforceability, procedural emphasis, and rule connectedness are the rule
characteristics outlined in Selectivity Theory. In Selectivity Theory, the likelihood of a rule
violation refers to the degree to which systemic factors within the organization and
regulatory environment will prompt the possibility of a violation of some rule (Lehman &
Ramanujam, 2009).
Selectivity Theory further suggests that an organization’s perception of risk and
6
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focus of attention mediate the relationship between the contextual conditions and rule
characteristics, and the likelihood of a rule violation. In Selectivity Theory, perception of risk
refers to the extent to which a rule violation will be perceived as having negative outcomes
that appear certain, severe, and uncontrollable (March & Shapira, 1987). Perception of risk
has a negative relationship with the likelihood an organization will violate a rule. That is, as
decision makers view a rule violation as riskier, they will be more likely to be deterred by
fear of negative outcomes and the associated uncontrollability caused by the regulatory
environment (Lehman & Ramanujam, 2009).
The other mediating variable, focus of attention, is based on the principle which
suggests “that decision-makers will be selective in the issues and [solutions] they attend to
at any one time and… that what decision-makers do depends on what issues and
[solutions] they focus their attention on” (Ocasio, 1997). Lehman and Ramanujam (2009)
offer little discussion on the focus of attention and its mediating role. Specifically, Selectivity
Theory uses focus of attention differently for each of the constructs representing the
contextual conditions and rule characteristics or only by implication. For this reason, we do
not use focus of attention as a construct in SIPVHOM, as operationalizing focus of attention
for each construct is outside our scope. Instead, we use focus of attention as a driving
assumption of the model and bring up its role throughout the paper. The inconsistency in
the use of focus of attention in Selectivity Theory also creates difficulty in offering a definite
directional relationship. However, to be consistent with the visual model presented by
Lehman and Ramanujam (2009), we present focus of attention as having a negative
mediating relationship, as with perception of risk. Figure 1 depicts Selectivity Theory.

7
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Figure 1. Selectivity Theory, from (Lehman & Ramanujam, 2009)

Each of the contextual conditions and rule characteristics in Selectivity Theory alter
the likelihood of a rule violation. Structural secrecy is one of the contextual conditions that
affects the likelihood of a rule violation. According to Vaughan (1996), structural secrecy
refers to “the way that patterns of information, organizational structures, processes, and
transactions, and the structure of regulatory relations systematically undermine the attempt
to know and interpret situations in organizations” (p. 647). Secrecy is created as the powers
for regulating and complying with a rule are concentrated into a single organizational
subunit (Kim et al., 2004). The concentration and isolation of rule related power into a single
subunit minimizes potential conflicts related to and detection of a violation (Vaughan, 1996),
which in turn decreases the perception of risk related to a rule violation. The decrease in the
8

Sprouts - http://sprouts.aisnet.org/11-138

perception of risk thereby increases the likelihood of a rule violation (Lehman &
Ramanujam, 2009).
Violation coupling is another contextual condition in Selectivity Theory. Violation
coupling describes “the perceived likelihood that… violations will lead to known outcomes—
either positive, such as a performance improvement, or negative, such as regulatory
penalties” (Lehman & Ramanujam, 2009). When coupling is tight, outcomes of violations
are well known and predictable, but when they are loose outcomes are unknown and
unpredictable (Lehman & Ramanujam, 2009). The predictability caused by tight coupling
allows organizational members to feel a sense of control over potential consequences
(Shapira, 1997), which sense of control reduces the perception of risk and increases the
likelihood of a rule violation (Lehman & Ramanujam, 2009).
However, when coupling is loose, outcomes of violations are not well known or
predictable. The ambiguity associated with loose coupling leads organizational members to
look to past actions to remedy organizational problems (Feldman & Pentland, 2003; March,
1997). If past solutions to a problem have resulted in rule violations, the ambiguity involved
in loose coupling will leave organizational members unsure of the risk involved—prompting
them to rely on the rule violating routines they have established previously (Lehman &
Ramanujam, 2009).
Enforceability is a rule characteristic in Selectivity Theory that affects the likelihood
of a rule violation. Enforceability is the extent to which organizations view regulatory
agencies as able and likely to monitor compliance with a rule and seek justice for violations
(Fuller et al., 2000). When opportunities to monitor an organization are high, organizational
members perceive the risk of rule violation as high since the chances of detection are high.
Similarly, the reduced control organizations have over the negative consequences that
9
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result from the regulatory intrusions increase the perception of risk and decrease the
likelihood of a rule violation (Lehman & Ramanujam, 2009). Conversely, when opportunities
to monitor an organization decrease, perceptions of risk decrease because organizations
can more plausibly deny accusations (Gioia, 1992).
Procedural emphasis is another rule characteristic in Selectivity Theory. Procedural
emphasis refers to whether the content of a rule emphasizes procedures over outcomes
(Lange, 2008). When desired outcomes of a law are perceived as ambiguous, or
procedural, organizational members seek to create interpretations of a rule, which
interpretations over time become routine ways of responding to the rule (Lehman &
Ramanujam, 2009). Once interpretations are routinized, organizational members feel a
sense of predictability and control (March, 1997). This perceived predictability and
controllability reduce perceptions of risk decrease, and thereby increase the likelihood of
rule violations (Lehman & Ramanujam, 2009).
Rule connectedness is another rule characteristic presented in Selectivity Theory.
Rule connectedness refers to the amount of interdependence or number of functional links
a rule has with other rules (March et al., 2000). When rules are highly connected,
coordination costs of violating a rule increase (Feldman & Pentland, 2003). Similarly, when
multiple regulators exist or a rule system is complex, organizational members might feel
less control over the domain of the rule (Lehman & Ramanujam, 2009). Multiple regulators
also increases the likelihood of detection and sanctions (March & Shapira, 1987). The
feeling of uncontrollability and the fear of sanctions increase the perception of risk involved
in violating a rule and decrease the likelihood that a rule will be violated (Lehman &
Ramanujam, 2009).

10
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KEY ASSUMPTIONS OF SELECTIVITY THEORY
Lehman and Ramanujam (2009) explain that several key assumptions frame
Selectivity Theory. We consider these assumptions carefully in adapting Selectivity Theory
to our context. We categorize the assumptions and constraints into those dealing with rules,
violations, and organizations. Table 1 summarizes the key assumptions that we leverage.
The assumptions dealing with the rules themselves limit the direct extension of the model to
other forms of social guidance or restraint, such as norms or standards. First, Selectivity
Theory views rules as constraints on organizational members—not as moral principles that
define social roles. Second, the scope of Selectivity Theory is on external formalized rules,
such as laws; not on internal rules because they vary from organization to organization.
Table 1. Assumptions of Selectivity Theory that Pertain to SIPVHOM, from (Lehman &
Ramanujam, 2009)
Category of
Assumptions
Rules

Rule violations

Organizations

Specific Assumption of the Model
Rules are viewed as constraints on organizational action and not as moral principles (p.
645)
Rules must be external and formal, such as laws (p. 644).
Rules must be low in ambiguity (p. 644).
Rule violations do not include individuals’ violations for personal gain or sabotage (p.
644).
Rule violations occur as the result of satisficing solutions, cause by limits to
organizational attention, that presents themselves during the search for solutions to
performance downfalls (p. 646).
Rules violations will focus around critical organizational resources and the interests of
powerful organizational coalitions (p. 647).
Perceptions of the risk involved directly influences rule violations (p. 646).
Dominant groups determine organizational actions predominantly (p. 646).
Organizations are governed by an aspiration level (p. 646)
The theoretical scope focuses only organizations that are vulnerable to committing
violations, such as those experiencing organizational strain through performance
downfalls or stiff competition (p. 646).

Third, Selectivity Theory is limited to rules that are reasonably low in ambiguity,
which means that organizations will have similar interpretations of the rules (Lehman &
Ramanujam, 2009). This does not mean that a rule must be completely clear; Selectivity
11
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Theory accounts for some ambiguity in its procedural emphasis construct.
Moreover, several assumptions describe the organizational factors assumed in
Selectivity Theory. First, organizational members join organizational coalitions that may
have differing goals and perceptions of organizational situations and circumstances (March
& Simon, 1958). The coalition(s) with access to more critical organizational resources have
greater influence over organizational actions (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Second,
organizational actions are guided by an aspiration level, which is an expected level of future
performance or achievement (Cyert & March, 1963). Third, when performance falls below
the aspiration level, organizations become more risk tolerant and are more likely to violate a
rule as they search for a solution to the performance problem (Lehman & Ramanujam,
2009). This assumption follows the logic of Strain Theory (Merton, 1938), which theory
suggests that entities that cannot attain culturally desirable goals through legitimate means
will seek to achieve the goals through deviant behaviors. Selectivity Theory therefore is
constrained to organizations experiencing strain caused by sources such as performance
decline, high competition, or heavy regulation.
The assumptions dealing with violations constrain to which objects Selectivity Theory
extends and how the likelihood of violations comes about. First, because Selectivity Theory
is concerned with organizational rule violations, the model does not explain or predict
individuals’ violations committed for personal gain or sabotage. Some constructs and
principles clearly apply to individuals committing violation, but explaining the underlying
phenomena requires an individual-level theory.
Second, as organizations begin to look for solutions to performance issues,
organizational attention is limited (March & Simon, 1958), thus limiting the number of
alternatives they can consider (Ocasio, 2002). Although not all alternatives will lead to rule
12
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violations (Lehman & Ramanujam, 2009), recent studies show that often these limited
alternatives do lead to violations (Alexander & Cohen, 1996; Harris & Bromiley, 2007). For
example, Harris and Bromiley (2007) conducted a study of firms that misrepresented
financial statements from 1997-2002. They compared data of firms that committed financial
fraud or misrepresentation with data of average performing firms in the same industries at
during the same period. The results showed firms that misrepresented financial statements
were more likely to be low performers in comparison to average performers.
Third, because organizational attention is limited, organizations will mainly focus
their attention on rules affecting critical resources or interests of powerful organizational
coalitions (Lehman & Ramanujam, 2009). This occurs because organizations seeking relief
to performance downfalls frame solutions in terms of regaining and maintaining critical
resources (Pfeffer, 1992).
Fourth, solutions to performance downfalls are filtered by the perceived risk of
implementing each alternative (Shapira, 1997; Slovic, 2000). As solutions are perceived as
more risky, the likelihood of a rule violation will decrease, and vice versa for solutions that
are perceived as less risky (Lehman & Ramanujam, 2009).
PROPOSING SIPVHOM TO EXPLAIN SELECTIVITY IN RULE VIOLATIONS EXTENDED
TO A HIPAA IT PRIVACY REGULATION CONTEXT
As mentioned, in recent years, HIT has become essential in the healthcare industry
(Rivard et al., 2011) and is now widely used (Feldman & Horan, 2011). Forecasts also
suggest a boom in the HIT market over the next several years (RNCOS, 2011a; RNCOS,
2011b; RNCOS, 2011c). To combat privacy violations in all domains, governments
worldwide have or are beginning to establish laws to protect individuals’ privacy. In the
United States, a series of laws guards privacy partially. HIPAA and the HITECH Act have
13
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taken the role of protecting PHI in the US. In other parts of the world, single laws protect
PHI and other types of protected information. For example, Canada’s Personal Information
Protection and Electronic Documents Act (PIPEDA) establishes guidelines for protecting the
electronic distribution of all types of private data, including PHI. The same is true for the
European Union Directive on Data Privacy (EUDDP) by the European Union. Besides laws,
international privacy standards like ISO 17799 are being developed to deal with the privacy
of personal information in information systems (Thomas & Botha, 2007). ISO 17799 is not
specifically for health records, but the standard covers all personal information, including
personal health records.
Organizations can jeopardize the privacy of patients’ PHI in many ways. IT privacy
violations can occur from basic monitor positioning or not encrypting patient data sent to
doctors’ cell phones. As illustration, a healthcare organization can fail to keep their some of
their transaction logs, which is a HIPAA breach. An example of an IT privacy violation is
demonstrated by the resolution agreement between HHS and UCLA (USDH&HS, 2011d). In
this case, numerous people accessed medical records over several years (2005-2008)
without authority or a reason to do so. A contrasting violation is reflected in the resolution
agreement between HHS and Cignet Health (USDH&HS, 2011d). This was the first civil
resolution with a monetary penalty (valued at $4.3 million). Cignet Health was fined for
refusing patient requests to access their own personal medical records.
Excepting ISO 17799, the mentioned privacy laws fit well into Selectivity Theory’s
constraints and driving assumptions—allowing our adaptation of Selectivity Theory to
SIPVHOM. For a review of the key assumptions of Selectivity Theory and SIPVHOM, see
Table 1. First, HIPAA, PIPEDA, and EUDDP are external formalized laws that govern
multiple organizations. Second, these laws and directives are relatively stable, limiting
14
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unreasonable amounts of ambiguity in the purpose of the laws. Third, a regulatory agency
governs the laws and directives. For example, HHS regulates HIPAA, and the office of the
privacy commissioner regulates PIPEDA. The regulatory powers given to these agencies
help to create a perception of risk, one of the important driving forces in Selectivity Theory
and SIPVHOM. Fourth, as with most organizations, healthcare organizations worldwide
have dominant coalitions that guide organizational actions. Finally, frequently healthcare
organizations worldwide experience organizational strain, from financial difficulties, strains
of growth, and burdensome regulations. Another potential stressor of healthcare
organizations that exchange information with other organizations (e.g. PHI data
warehouses) is incompatible internal IT privacy policies, along with incompatible data
storage and handling. If the policies do not match well, organizations may find it is too costly
to fully comply with the corresponding group, leaving violations as an opportunity cost
(Feldman & Horan, 2011).
In proposing SIPVHOM, we use HIPAA as a proxy for other healthcare privacy laws,
though some adaptation may be necessary to account for cultural factors when studying
related laws in other countries. HIPAA gives the United States Office for Civil Rights the
authority and guidelines to protect a person’s PHI (USDH&HS, 2011e). HIPAA is monitored
and regulated by HHS, and provides federal US protections for PHI held by covered
entities, giving patients an array of rights with respect to that information (USDH&HS, 2007).
Section D of the HITECH Act extends HIPAA rules, particularly those related to HIT. The
HITECH Act has guidelines for safeguarding electronic storage and transmission of PHI and
gives HHS power to issue heavy fines for violation of any of HIPAA’s rules.
HIPAA is a useful surrogate for other privacy laws because it is standardized,
formalized, used by a large population (Warkentin et al., 2011), and is quite expansive in its
15
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coverage. HIPAA consists of privacy rules, security rules, breach notification rules, and
enforcement rules. The privacy rules outline appropriate uses and disclosures of PHI. The
security rules establish appropriate administrative, physical, and technical measures to
ensure the security of electronic PHI. The breach notification rules, an extension of HIPAA
established by the HITECH Act, require healthcare organizations to provide timely
notification of electronic breaches of unsecured PHI. The enforcement rules, also extended
by the HITECH ACT, further establish provisions for conducting investigations of HIPAA
violations and imposing fines. Importantly, HIPAA is also particular to healthcare, making it
easier to isolate IT privacy violations by healthcare organizations.
EXTENDING PROPOSITIONS TO A HIPAA IT CONTEXT
SIPVHOM adopts the propositions proposed by Lehman & Ramanujam (2009) in
Selectivity Theory, excepting the propositions which refer to focus of attention, to explain
and predict IT privacy rule violations committed by healthcare organizations. SIPVHOM
uses focus of attention as a driving axiom, but not as a construct. Beyond adopting
Selectivity Theory’s propositions to a healthcare context, we further operationalize the
propositions into a series of testable hypotheses. Appendix A provides several possible
measures that might be useful in testing the hypotheses. We begin unfolding SIPVHOM by
examining perceived risk as a predictor of the likelihood of IT privacy rule violations and
offer testable hypotheses. We then discuss the contextual conditions and rule
characteristics in SIPVHOM that affect the perceived risk of violating IT privacy rules. Figure
2 depicts SIPVHOM and its hypotheses.
Proposition 1: An increased perception of risk decreases the likelihood that a privacy
rule will be selected for violation
An increase in the perceived risk associated with a rule violation will decrease the
16
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Figure 2. Selective Information Privacy Violations in Healthcare
Organizations Model (SIPVHOM)

likelihood that the rule will be violated (Lehman & Ramanujam, 2009). Perceptions of risk
“will vary across organizations, depending on their histories, structures, and cultures”
(Lehman & Ramanujam, 2009). As organizations’ members search for solutions to
organizational strain, alternatives will be selected based on their perceived risk (Shapira,
1997; Slovic, 2000). Alternatives that involve a rule violation will be perceived as riskier to
17
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the extent that negative outcomes appear more certain, severe, and uncontrollable (March
& Shapira, 1987). The more that a negative outcome is potentially threatening to the
organization's legitimacy, the more risky it will seem (Zucker, 1977). As decision makers
perceive an alternative resulting in a rule violation as riskier, they will be less likely to select
the alternative and violate the rule (Lehman & Ramanujam, 2009).
To operationalize perceptions of risk and the likelihood of rule violations, we
leverage research by Dinev & Hart (2006) and D’Arcy et al. (2009). Although most of the
conceptualizations of risk in IS literature have focused on economic loss (Jarvenpaa et al.,
2000; Pavlou, 2003; Pavlou & Geffen, 2004), Dinev and Hart (2006) show that risk can be
conceptualized in other ways that may be more salient to situational factors. For example,
they focus their study on privacy risk (the perceived uncertainty related to disclosing
personal information) relative to individuals’ e-commerce purchasing behaviors. Importantly,
for e-commerce purchasing behavior, conceptualizing risk as privacy risk “might be… more
influential… than economic risk in dissuading individuals from conducting e-commerce
transactions” (Dinev & Hart, 2006). Although this paper is not interested in privacy risk, nor
e-commerce, the flexibility in selecting non-economic risk factors that are salient to
healthcare organizations makes Dinev and Hart’s (2006) conceptualization of risk useful to
the economically neutral description of risk proposed in SIPVHOM.
Dinev and Hart’s (2006) conceptualization of risk is also compelling because it links
risk to behavioral intention. We suggest that the behavioral intention to violate a HIPAA rule
is an appropriate operationalization for the likelihood of a HIPAA rule violation. The logical
jump from the behavioral intention to violate a rule to the likelihood of a rule violation is not a
big leap, because behavioral intention is often measured on a continuum (e.g., weak
intention to strong intention) (e.g., D'Arcy et al., 2009; Johnston & Warkentin, 2010). This is
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the essence of the Theory of Reasoned Action (TRA) (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980) and the
Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB) (Ajzen, 1988). Thus, as intentions to violate weaken so
does the likelihood of a rule violation. Importantly, behavioral intention has been widely
used as a construct in IS research and—important to our study—in IS security research. For
example, D’Arcy et al. (2009) use behavioral intention to account for individual’s misuse of
an organization’s IS, such as privacy breaches or property damage. Like their study, we are
interested in the misuse of privacy, but unlike their study, we are only interested in privacy
violations. Since our study ultimately focuses on IT privacy rule violations, we make use of
D’Arcy et al. (2009) IS misuse intention as a representation of the likelihood of a rule
violation.
Similar to Lehman and Ramanujam (2009), Dinev and Hart (2006) suggest that
perceptions of risk result from fear and uncertainty about negative consequences of actions.
They further posit that concern about the perceived risk—an internalization of the potential
negative consequences associated with an action—will lead to further uncertainty and
thereby strengthen the effect of risk on behavioral intention. Lastly, they suggest that people
will try to avoid perceived negative consequences. The desire to avoid negative
consequences is consistent with expectancy theory (Van Eerde & Thierry, 1996; Vroom,
1964), which predicts that individuals act in ways that will minimize negative outcomes and
maximize positive outcomes. Following this logic, decision makers in charge of HIPAA
compliance will avoid alternatives to performance downfalls that result in a HIPAA rule
violation to the extent that the consequences of violating the rule are perceived negatively.
In summary,
H1: An increase in the perceived risk of violating a HIPAA rule will decrease the
intention of violating the rule.
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Proposition 2: Structural secrecy decreases perception of risk
Structural secrecy is a contextual condition that affects the likelihood of a privacyrule violation. An increase in structural secrecy decreases the perception of risk and
subsequently increases the likelihood that a rule will be violated (Lehman & Ramanujam,
2009). High secrecy occurs when roles and responsibilities for monitoring and complying
with a rule are concentrated into a single subunit (Kim et al., 2004). This concentration of
rule-related power into a single subunit can occur with the division of labor, organizational
hierarchy, and job specialization that isolate knowledge of rule-related tasks (Vaughan,
1996). Furthermore, secrecy increases when the activities of the subunit are dissociated
from other subunits (March & Simon, 1958). Informal relationships between members of
subunits have been shown to have more influence on communication structures than formal
relationships (Ghoshal et al., 1994). The increase in secrecy caused by the dissociation of
subunits therefore could increase if the members of the subunit in charge of rule compliance
are removed from informal networking structures as well as from formal structures. When
secrecy is high, the isolation of rule-related power and knowledge helps to minimize
potential conflicts related to and detection of a violation (Vaughan, 1996), which decreases
the perception of risk related to a rule violation (Lehman & Ramanujam, 2009). Sharing the
roles and responsibilities for monitoring and complying with a rule amongst organizational
subunits can help to reduce secrecy (Lehman & Ramanujam, 2009).
Management or other dominant coalitions can foster structural secrecy to guard
managerial interests and to protect critical resources that are vulnerable to external rules
(Lehman & Ramanujam, 2009). In the practice of medicine, some of the most important
organizational values and interests of dominant coalitions (e.g., doctors, nurses, hospital
administrators) include the quality and efficiency of the care provided to patients (Grol,
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2001; Schade et al., 2006; Teasdale, 2008), and a strong valuation of autonomy and status
by physicians and other healthcare professionals (Rivard et al., 2011). Where HIPAA
infringes on the quality or efficiency of care, or the autonomy or status of healthcare
professionals, secrecy is likely to be high. HIPAA mandates that organizations must
establish a system for monitoring and complying with HIPAA rules, but offers flexibility in the
design of the regulatory system (USDH&HS, 2011d). Similarly, HHS does not actively
monitor compliance (Administration, 2011). Together, these factors make designing an
organizational regulatory system high in secrecy less detectable and more feasible for
organizations governed by HIPAA.
In general, the healthcare industry—especially hospitals and clinics—are likely to be
high in structural secrecy. Again, physicians value and seek for a high degree of autonomy
in their work. In essence, a physician’s autonomy is parallel to isolating power into a single
subunit. The extent to which physicians are granted full autonomy to make decisions
regarding their patients and patient data fosters structural secrecy. The “clan” mentality
shared by physicians also fosters secrecy. That is, physicians tend to rely heavily on the
opinions of other physicians while ignoring opinions of external groups (Agarwal et al.,
2007). Because physicians tend to ignore external influence, the “clan” mentality is parallel
to being removed from informal communication structures, which further increases secrecy.
Similarly, private-sector medical organizations are more likely to hoard
organizational resources than public sector organizations—leading to an increase in
structural secrecy in private sector organizations. This notion receives support from the
findings of Johnston and Warkentin (2008). They show that employees of public sector
medical organizations are more likely to feel efficacy and support in their privacy
compliance efforts than employees in private-sector medical organizations. This could be
21

Sprouts - http://sprouts.aisnet.org/11-138

the case if public-sector medical organizations receive more resources (and oversight) to
comply with rules like HIPAA. If true, private-sector medical organizations, would be more
likely to engage in activities to protect critical organizational resources, and may therefore,
intentionally create structural secrecy.
Organizations in the healthcare industry can reduce structural secrecy in several
ways. For example, hospitals can establish inter-unit teams of administrators, doctors, and
nurses dedicated to interpreting and monitoring HIPAA regulations. To take advantage of
the “clan” mentality of physicians, hospital or clinic administrators might also seek to gain
approval of highly regarded physicians, allowing these physicians to influence other
physicians. Similarly, Nicholson and Smith (2007) looked at the impact of HIPAA and other
policies that protect personal health information. They found that government policies such
as HIPAA merely highlight the deficiencies inherent in medical record privacy systems.
They suggest that the best approach to compliance is to emphasize education about the
key issues within HIPAA: confidentiality and sensitivity. Organization-wide HIPAA training
would likely reduce secrecy by creating a sense that HIPAA-related violations can be easily
exposed to the entire organization.
Because no valid measure currently exists for structural secrecy, to operationalize
the relationship between structural secrecy and perception of risk, we focus on
operationalizations of communication structures. Communication structures have been
shown to affect intra-organizational knowledge sharing (Tsai, 2002). Communication
structures refer to the formal and informal structures that direct and regulate communication
within an organization (Ghoshal et al., 1994; Tsai, 2002). Formal communication structures
are those created by organizational hierarchy. Formal structures consist of centralization,
formalization, and specialization (Miller & Droge, 1986; Van de Ven, 1976). Centralization,
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for example, is an important element in organizational structure and has been shown to be
a parsimonious representation of formal structure (Ghoshal et al., 1994). According to Tsai
(2002), centralization can create inefficiencies in the transfer of knowledge, and can also
create an inactive role for subunits that do not hold decision-making authority. This inactive
role may “reduce the initiatives that a [subunit] takes in” exchanging information with other
subunits (Tsai, 2002, p. 181). These findings about centralization are consistent with the
findings of (Kim et al., 2004) on secrecy. By obscuring information, centralization acts to
create secrecy, and as predicted by Lehman and Ramanujam (2009), this will decrease
perceptions of detection and the risk involved in violating a rule. Accordingly, healthcare
organizations that centralize the power of monitoring and complying with HIPAA regulations
will likely experience increased secrecy and decreased perceptions of risk. In summary,
H2: An increase in the centralization of power related to HIPAA compliance will
decrease the perceived risk associated with a HIPAA rule violation.
Informal communication structures have also been shown to affect the transfer of
knowledge (Tsai, 2002). In fact, informal structures can have more influence on
communication than formal structures (Ghoshal et al., 1994). Informal communication
structures are relationships that develop laterally or horizontally, rather than vertically as
occurs in organizations with high centralization. Unlike centralization, informal relationships
help to improve the exchange of information between organizational subunits (Homans,
1950), and can even give subunits access to other subunits and their resources (Gupta &
Govindarajan, 1986). This exchange and access facilitates knowledge sharing (Tsai, 2002)
and therefore decreases the likelihood of high structural secrecy. Hence, healthcare
organizations that encourage lateral communication through informal relations with
members of other subunits will experience an increase in knowledge sharing, thereby
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decreasing the chance of structural secrecy. In summary,
H3: An increase in informal networking opportunities between a subunit in charge of
HIPAA compliance and other subunits will increase the perceived risk associated
with a HIPAA rule violation.
Proposition 3: Violation coupling affects perception of risk
Violation coupling is another contextual condition that affects the violation likelihood
of a privacy rule. When organizational members detect a tightly coupled connection
between prior rule violations and the associated outcomes, perceptions of risk increase
when the outcome is negative and decrease when the outcome is positive (Lehman &
Ramanujam, 2009). When coupling is tight, organizational members perceive the outcome
of a violation as predictable. Whereas, when coupling is loose, outcomes of a violation are
ambiguous and not easily predicted (Lehman & Ramanujam, 2009). When coupling is tight
and prior outcomes are positive, organizational members feel a sense of control over
potential consequences (Shapira, 1997). Violations tightly coupled to positive outcomes,
therefore, are less likely to be perceived as risky and are more likely to be repeated
(Lehman & Ramanujam, 2009). However, when violations are tightly coupled to negative
outcomes, the perception of risk increases (Holland, 1975) and the rule is less likely to be
selected for violation (Lehman & Ramanujam, 2009).
Due to the complexity of organizations, however, loose coupling is far more
prevalent than tight coupling (Lehman & Ramanujam, 2009). Some of the reasons for the
pervasiveness of loose coupling include dissociation between the violators of a rule and
those who experience the outcomes; the occurrence of violations and outcomes at different
points in time; one violation leading to multiple outcomes; one outcome stemming from
multiple causes; and a lack of organizational memory (Lehman & Ramanujam, 2009).
This situation may be particularly true with regard to HIPAA rules. First, the
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healthcare industry is very complex. The industry is highly fragmented with multiple players
(Bentley et al., 2008). Second, HIPAA regulations allow organizations to outsource their
data storage and other HIPAA regulated tasks (USDH&HS, 2003). By outsourcing,
violations made by the outsourcer could be dissociated from the outcomes experienced by
the organization or create a lack of organizational memory. Lastly, HHS does not monitor
compliance of HIPAA, but asks that victims report abuses (Administration, 2011). If a delay
occurs between a HIPAA privacy violation and the time that a patient reports the abuse or
HHS commences an investigation, loose coupling is possible.
When an organization cannot detect a tightly coupled connection between prior rule
violations and the associated outcomes, perceptions of risk decrease (Lehman &
Ramanujam, 2009). The ambiguity resulting from loose coupling drives an organization to
identify agreeable interpretations of an outcome, which interpretations are not necessarily
correct (Weick, 1995). Organizations often fulfill this need by looking to past actions and rely
on previous alternatives to remedy problems (Feldman & Pentland, 2003; March, 1997).
Similarly, to validate prior decisions, organizational members may construe outcomes in a
self-justifying manner (March, 1997). If an organization has previously violated a rule, due to
the ambiguity caused by loose coupling and the ease of relying on past alternatives, the risk
of violating the rule again may not be easily discernible (Lehman & Ramanujam, 2009).
Healthcare organizations may be more likely to experience loose coupling. For example,
HIPAA has a self-reporting and patient-reporting mechanism (Administration, 2011), and if
neither is activated, then a violation may never be detected and lead to bad habits or policy
work around.
To operationalize violation coupling, we focus on one of the conditions that creates
loose coupling—lack of organizational memory. Organizational memory refers to the
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“collective beliefs, behavioral routines, or physical artifacts that vary in their content, level,
dispersion, and accessibility” (Moorman & Miner, 1997). As suggested in this definition,
multiple forms of organizational memory exist, including beliefs, behavioral routines and
procedures, and physical artifacts such as organizational structure. In healthcare
organizations, organizational memory might manifest itself through beliefs and values such
as quality of care. Concerning IT privacy violations, organizational memory might manifest
itself in policies and procedures on using computer systems to minimize HIPAA violations.
As suggested above, perceptions of risk decrease as the organizational memory on
violation outcomes diminishes. Since violations are primarily actions, we focus our study of
organization memory primarily on behavioral routines and procedures rather than on beliefs
and values or physical artifacts.
Organizational memory can affect violation coupling in several ways. First, the
dispersion of organizational memory may not be widely accepted (Moorman & Miner, 1997).
Certain organizational subcultures, for example, might be slow to adopt organizational
memory (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Deshpande & Frederick E. Webster, 1989; Martin & Siehl,
1983; Smircich, 1983). In hospitals, three main groups exist with separate values—nurses,
doctors, and administrators (Rivard et al., 2011). Each group has different views on the
organization and on violations of HIPAA. In general, administrators feel the greatest need to
comply with HIPAA rules, whereas doctors and nurses may see the rules as hindrances to
the quality or efficiency of providing care to patients. Similarly, administrators feel a greater
self-efficacy to comply than do medical staff (Johnston & Warkentin, 2008).
Nurses and doctors thus might have less organizational memory of HIPAA
compliance procedures and are more likely to violate them. This may be particularly true for
physicians if the “clan” mentality held amongst physicians is opposed to HIPAA or HITECH
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Act regulations. Venkatesh et al. (2011) show that a physician’s professional network has a
negative effect on the use of e-healthcare systems. Physicians, therefore, may be opposed
to the goals of the HITECH Act. However, if the “clan” mentality is leveraged to promote
compliance with privacy laws, HIPAA- and HITECH-related organizational memory may
improve. When organizational memory of HIPAA related procedures and outcomes are
widely dispersed, the salience of HIPAA violations and the associated outcomes are likely
to rise. This is turn will create the outcome-based risk perceptions predicted by Lehman and
Ramanujam (2009). In summary,
H4a: When the dispersion of organizational memory of HIPAA related information is
low, prior HIPAA violations will decrease the perception of risk despite the prior
outcomes associated with a HIPAA rule violation.
H4b: When the dispersion of organizational memory is high, prior HIPAA violations
with positive outcomes will decrease the perception of risk associated with a HIPAA
rule violation.
H4c: When the dispersion of organizational memory is high, prior HIPAA violations
with negative outcomes will increase the perception of risk associated with a HIPAA
rule violation.
Third, the accessibility to organizational memory may be restricted (Moorman &
Miner, 1997). Lehman and Ramanujam (2009) suggest that organizations may seek to
increase structural secrecy by isolating information about monitoring of and compliance with
a rule in order to create opportunities for violation. They explain that this may be particularly
true for rules that inhibit the pursuit or maintenance of critical organizational resources
(Lehman & Ramanujam, 2009). Similarly, they suggest that organizational structures can
create secrecy by isolating compliance and monitoring responsibilities into a single
organizational subunit. Ultimately, structural secrecy minimizes the amount of organizational
knowledge about a given subject distributed to other parts of the organization. When
organizations isolate information—on purpose or unintentionally through the design of
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organizational structures—the accessibility to organizational memory is likely to decrease.
In summary,
H5a: When structural secrecy is high, prior HIPAA violations will decrease the
perception of risk despite the prior outcomes associated with a HIPAA rule violation.
H5b: When structural secrecy is low, prior HIPAA violations with positive outcomes
will decrease the perception of risk associated with a HIPAA rule violation.
H5c: When structural secrecy is low, prior HIPAA violations with negative outcomes
will increase the perception of risk associated with a HIPAA rule violation.
Proposition 4: Enforceability increases perception of risk
The enforceability of a privacy rule is a rule characteristic that affects the likelihood
of rule violation. An increase in the enforceability of a rule increases the perception of risk,
making a rule less likely to be violated (Lehman & Ramanujam, 2009). Enforceability is high
when regulatory agencies are able to frequently monitor the actions of an organization,
which is most likely to occur when the regulatory agency and the organization are highly
interdependent (Edelman, 1992). Enforceability also increases when the social
consequences for seeking justice for violations are low (Fuller et al., 2000). This is likely to
occur when a regulatory agency “exert[s] strong influence on [an] organization” (Lehman &
Ramanujam, 2009). However, to avoid alienating powerful constituencies, regulatory
agencies do not always exert their full influence (Edelman & Suchman, 1997). When
chances to monitor an organization are high, enforceability increases the perceived risk of
violating a rule by increasing the chances of detection and reducing the control
organizations have over the negative consequences that can result from a rule violation
(Lehman & Ramanujam, 2009). In contrast, when chances to monitor an organization
decrease, perceptions of risk decrease because organizations are better able to deny
accusations plausibly (Gioia, 1992) and increase control by creating symbolic compliance
(Edelman, 1992).
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To operationalize enforceability, we rely on deterrence theory. Deterrence theory
comes from criminology research, but IS security research has also recently applied this
theory to information security policy compliance research (e.g., D'Arcy et al., 2009; Qing et
al., 2011; Siponen & Vance, 2010). Deterrence theory states that perceptions of sanctions
designed to punish violators deters individuals from deviant behavior. Research has looked
at multiple characteristics of sanctions in inducing deterrence, including the severity of
sanctions, the certainty of sanctions, and the celerity of sanctions. Severity of sanctions
refers to “the perceived degree of punishment for [an] intended act” (Qing et al., 2011, p.
57). Certainty of sanctions refers to “the perceived probability of being punished for [an]
intended act” (Qing et al., 2011, p. 57). Celerity of sanctions refers to “the perceived
swiftness of being punished for [an] intended act (Qing et al., 2011, p. 57). Much debate
exists about the strength and importance of each of these characteristics, and some
contradictory findings exist with regard to deterrence theory in general. For example, D’Arcy
et al. (2009) found evidence that severity of sanctions is more effective in deterring deviant
behavior than the certainty of sanctions, whereas Nagin and Pogarsky (2001) did not. Qing
et al. (2011) also found no evidence of deterrence effects. We do not take issue with these
findings, but instead rely on the theoretical basis of deterrence theory to explain how
sanctions might affect risk perceptions in decision makers.
The certainty of sanctions and the severity of sanctions create a sense of fear, which
acts to deter IS violations (D'Arcy et al., 2009). Both enforceability as proposed in Selectivity
Theory and the certainty and severity of sanctions, as proposed in deterrence theory,
suggest that fear of negative outcomes reduces the likelihood of deviant behaviors. Again,
the desire to avoid negative consequences is consistent with expectancy theory (Van Eerde
& Thierry, 1996; Vroom, 1964).
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Currently, HIPAA does not directly monitor organizational actions, but relies instead
on victims to report violations (Administration, 2011). According to Miller and Sarat (1981),
when victims are left to report abuses, laws are more likely to be abused than when the
rules are monitored by third-party agencies. Additionally, few documented cases of
regulatory sanctions for HIPAA violations exist. In fact, as of 2008, the HHS reported that it
had received over 33,000 complaints pertaining to privacy violations but no fines had been
levied (Insider, 2008). The lack of previous negative outcomes makes HIPAA penalties
appear to be unlikely and uncertain. In summary,
H6: An increase in the certainty of sanctions for a HIPAA rule violation will increase
the perceived risk associated with the HIPAA rule violation.
However, despite the uncertainty of sanctions related to HIPAA violations, some
financial settlements exist, including a $2.25 million settlement by CVS for not disposing of
records correctly and a $1 million settlement made by RiteAid for improperly disposing of pill
bottles and labels (USDH&HS, 2011a; USDH&HS, 2011e). Similarly, with the advent of the
HITECH Act, stiff penalties are increasingly common—such as a $1 million fine assessed to
Massachusetts General Hospital and a $4.3 million fine to Cignet Healthcare. For these
organizations, repeat offenses would be less likely due to an increase in the perceived risk
created by severe fines and settlements. In summary,
H7: An increase in the severity of sanctions for a HIPAA rule violation will increase
the perceived risk associated with the HIPAA rule violation.
Lastly, the celerity of sanctions decreases deviance. However, celerity has been
shown to be the weakest characteristic of sanctions (Nagin & Pogarsky, 2001). Pavlovian
conditioning is the basis of celerity—particularly the conditioning of responses by timely
negative reinforcement. This conditioning was predicted for animals, and humans “possess
a far greater cognitive capacity than do animals for connecting acts with temporally remote
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consequences” (Nagin & Pogarsky, 2001, p. 867). Nonetheless, to be consistent with
deterrence theory in its entirety we present celerity in the model. In comparison to other
government sanctions, HIPAA sanctions may be particularly slow to occur. As suggested
above, HIPAA violations are self-reported and any delay in a patient reporting violations will
decrease celerity. Similarly, many reported abuses are resolved before HHS can even find
the time to start an investigation. Given this information, we offer the following hypothesis:
H8: An increase in the celerity of sanctions for a HIPAA rule violation will increase the
perceived risk associated with the HIPAA rule violation.
Proposition 5: Procedural emphasis decreases perception of risk
Procedural emphasis is another rule characteristic that affects the likelihood of a
privacy rule violation. An increase in procedural emphasis decreases the perception of risk,
and subsequently increases the likelihood of a rule violation (Lehman & Ramanujam, 2009).
When procedural emphasis is high, the desired outcomes of a rule are ambiguous.
Whereas, when it is low, a rule is unambiguous and desired outcomes are clearly defined
(Edelman, 1992). According to Lehman and Ramanujam (2009), organizational
interpretations of a rule in situations where procedural emphasis is high can lead to a
routinized interpretation of the rule that holds true even in unambiguous situations. This
occurs through the managerialization of law “wherein legal ideas are refigured by
managerial ways of thinking as they flow across the boundaries of legal fields and into
managerial and organizational fields” (Edelman et al., 2001, p. 1589). Interpretations of
rules tend to be guided by the pursuit of critical, organizational resources (Lehman &
Ramanujam, 2009). Power struggles about the interpretations of a rule create emerging
meaning (Pfeffer, 1992). The meaning is legitimized by powerful organizational members to
favor their particular interpretations (Johnson et al., 2006), which interpretations become
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stabilized methods for maintaining and acquiring critical resources (Lehman & Ramanujam,
2009). As interpretations of rules stabilize and become routinized, organizational members
view them as predictable and controllable (March, 1997). The routinized interpretations
cause perceptions of risk to decrease, even in unambiguous situations (Lehman &
Ramanujam, 2009).
In the healthcare industry, one power struggle for interpreting HIPAA rules manifests
as a struggle between administrators and physicians over the degree of physician
autonomy in complying with HIPAA. Due to the physician “clan” mentality, physicians are
likely to interpret HIPAA rules in a self-interested manner that minimizes encroachments on
physician autonomy and maximizes the efficiency and quality of care they can provide to
patients.
We propose goal clarity as a useful surrogate to procedural emphasis. Goal clarity
refers to the extent to which a goal designates a clear course of action and provides
information about how to achieve the goal (Tziner et al., 1993). When the goal clarity of a
rule is high, the rule’s expected outcomes are defined clearly. As predicted by Lehman and
Ramanujam (2009), when outcomes are clearly defined ambiguity will be low—making
plausible deniability less likely and perceived risk high. Currently, many of HIPAA’s rules are
flexible and allow for interpretations, calling for “reasonable” actions (USDH&HS, 2008).
Similarly, the interpretations of HIPAA rules are continually evolving (Wipke-Tevis & Pickett,
2008). These circumstances make certain HIPAA rules lower in goal clarity and higher in
procedural emphasis—increasing violation likelihood. In summary,
H9: An increase in the goal clarity of a HIPAA rule will decrease the perception of risk
associated with the rule.
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Proposition 6: Rule connectedness increases perception of risk
Rule connectedness is another rule characteristic that affects the likelihood of a
privacy rule violation. An increase in rule connectedness will increase perceptions of risk
and thereby decrease the likelihood of a rule violation (Lehman & Ramanujam, 2009).
When connectedness is high, a rule has many interdependent rules. Whereas, when
connectedness is low, a rule has no interdependent rules, or only a few (Lehman &
Ramanujam, 2009). Connectedness increases perceived risk in two ways. First,
coordination costs increase when rules are highly connected (Feldman & Pentland, 2003).
Second, when multiple regulators exist or the rule system is complex, organizational
members may feel less control (Lehman & Ramanujam, 2009), which increases the
likelihood of detection and sanctions (March & Shapira, 1987). The increase in coordination
costs and likelihood of detection increase the perception of risk involved in violating a rule.
Several factors can establish high rule connectedness. First, complex work may
require more interdependencies between rules to help govern the complexity (Scott, 2002).
Similarly, multiple governing bodies may issue interdependent rules in a complex
environment where each agency participates in regulation (Landau, 1969). Additionally,
large-scale crises may induce the creation of interdependent rules (Collins et al., 2005;
March et al., 2000). Rule connectedness can also increase purposefully when rules or
governing agencies are strategically created to ensure conformity (Lehman & Ramanujam,
2009).
Furthermore, we argue that in an IT context, the advent of new technology can lead
to the creation of new rules. For example, the ubiquity of HIT in the healthcare industry
prompted legislators to create the HITECH Act. The act was created to encourage the
meaningful use and adoption of HIT (USDH&HS, 2011c). Subtitle D of the HITECH Act
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micromanages the details surrounding the electronic transmission of PHI and now adds civil
and criminal penalties for violations (USDH&HS, 2011c). The introduction of HITECH Act
will likely reduce the likelihood of future HIPAA violations relative to the growth of HIT.
Lastly, we argue that global connections between physicians may increase rule
connectedness. For example, European nations are attributed with being more concerned
with patient privacy than nations like the US. To the extent that highly respected physicians
in Europe with pro-privacy ideals associate with physicians in other parts of the world, the
influence of European privacy ideals may spread to other parts of the world, thereby
increasing perceptions of rule connectedness.
To operationalize rule connectedness we rely on Sullivan’s (2010) measure of rule
density. Like Lehman and Ramanujam (2009), Sullivan (2010) shows how organizational
attention can affect rules. Selectivity Theory uses organizational attention to describe how
rules that are highly connected draw attention. Conversely, Sullivan (2010) uses
organizational attention to describe how regulating bodies focus attention on certain
problems to create new rules in a rule domain. In essence, both authors are investigating
the number of related rules. Therefore, rule density serves as an excellent measure for rule
connectedness. In summary,
H10: An increase in the rule density of a HIPAA rule will increase the perceived risk of
violating the rule.
DISCUSSION
Given the many problems that healthcare institutions face in regard to compliance
with IT medical privacy laws, this paper proposed SIPVHOM (see Figure 2), which is a
model developed to explain and predict violations of IT privacy rules. In particular, we use
HIPAA as a proxy for IT privacy violations. IT privacy violations are of particular importance
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because of the ubiquity of the electronic transfer and display of protected medical
information (HIMSS, 2010). Although we selected HIPAA as a surrogate privacy law to
create a seamless story for SIPVHOM, the model can also help to predict organizational
compliance with similar privacy laws—such as PIPEDA in Canada or EUDDP.
SIPVHOM is based primarily on Selectivity Theory (Lehman & Ramanujam, 2009), a
model proposed to predict selectivity in organizational rule violations. Like Selectivity
Theory, SIPVHOM suggests that a series of contextual conditions and rule characteristics
affect the perception of risk involved in violating a rule, and thereby, the likelihood that a rule
will be selected for violation. We offer testable hypotheses of the propositions of Selectivity
Theory contextualized to HIPPA. With the recent adoption of the HITECH Act in the US and
its role in allowing the first significant fines for HIPAA violations starting in 2011, we offer a
timely investigation of the topic of medical privacy laws. In the future, SIPVHOM can help
explain the likely changes in compliance due to the advent of the HITECH Act. Ultimately,
we believe SIPVHOM can help to inform the creation and reform of privacy laws and the
structuring of the regulatory environments that govern them and the organizations that must
follow them.
Although the focus of this paper has been on healthcare organizations, researchers
can likely extend SIPVHOM to other related domains. As illustration, credit card fraud is a
colossal issue for consumers, credit-card companies, and credit-card issuing banks. Few
formalized, external rules exist to mandate how organizations should deal with the
electronic transfer of credit card data; however, a sort of private ordering has emerged in
the credit card industry. The industry has created a form of external control through the
Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard (PCI DSS). Although not a traditional law,
PCI DSS contains many of the same qualities of a formalized law that make Selectivity
35

Sprouts - http://sprouts.aisnet.org/11-138

Theory and SIPVHOM ideal models to explain and predict violations of PCI DSS. The listed
core assumptions of SIPVHOM are the primarily constraints that researchers should
consider for such an extension. Nonetheless, further theoretical development could
neutralize many of the limiting assumptions. For example, researchers could likely apply
many of the concepts of SIPVHOM to an individual context by substituting organizational
theories with individual-level psychological theories.
LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH
The primary limitation of SIPVHOM is that it has not been empirically tested (neither
has Selectivity Theory). To help facilitate the future testing of SIPVHOM, we thus briefly
address ways researchers might operationalize and test its constructs. In doing so, it is
important to note that multiple measures exist for some of the constructs; thus, using
discretion is pivotal in selecting the most appropriate and representative measures to
maximize construct validity. Some of the constructs also do not have closely associated
measures from the literature, which makes opertionalization more challenging. For these
constructs, we suggest possible measurement surrogates. Appendix A summarizes these
possibilities.
In terms of testing, preliminary studies could test the hypotheses through scenariosbased approach where working professionals receive hypothetical vignettes to test the
underlying theory. This approach has several advantages when dealing with topics with
which participants do not want to disclose their individual involvement in and knowledge of
the organization’s violations, and has been effectively used in IS compliance research (e.g.,
Hu et al., 2011; Siponen & Vance, 2010). Testing can then evolve to more challenging field
studies of actual organizations that are required to follow HIPAA. More complex testing
could also potentially use large samples of randomly selected organizations and randomly
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selected individuals within these organizations. Finally, organizations from different cultures
and with different HIPAA-like regulations would be useful to study. A study of SIPVHOM
focused on organizational culture could also be useful because the interplay between
doctors, nurses, and administrators has been shown to be important in daily hospital life
(Rivard et al., 2011).
Another limitation of SIPVHOM includes the lack of predictive and explanative power
with regard to organizations performing at or above their aspiration levels, and internal rules
and regulations. Again, part of SIPVHOM’s foundation is Merton’s Strain Theory (1938),
which is leveraged to suggest that organizations that cannot obtain socially desirable goals
through legitimate means might seek to fulfill their goals through deviant behavior. This
theoretical foundation limits the predictive power of our model to those organizations that
cannot attain their aspiration level. SIPVHOM is also restricted to predicting external
formalized rules, and does not extend to social norms related to privacy, or internal
regulations of organizations. Because social norms are unregulated in the same manner as
formalized rules, they do not fit SIPVHOM well, and the nuances in the differences between
internal rules and regulations would likely pose a problem in showing selectivity of rule
violations at an organizational level.
Similarly, Selectivity Theory suggests that organizational attention is an important
mediating construct in explaining violations, but the evidence and discussion of focus of
attention is scant in Lehman and Ramanujam’s (2009) article. For this reason, SIPVHOM
does not apply focus of attention as a construct, but instead uses the concept as an axiom
to describe certain aspects of the model. Future research can revisit and further build the
link to organizational attention.
Finally, it could be beneficial to study SIPVHOM in the context of multiple privacy
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laws. For example, HIPAA, PIPEDA, or EUDDP could be examined together to determine if
the rule characteristics or contextual conditions related to the laws cause differences in the
frequency or severity of violations. Importantly, future studies could also look at HIPAA
violations and mobile technology, since many current uses of mobile technology used by
doctors and nurses are breaches of HIPAA rules. Lastly, future studies might further explore
the role of organizational attention on IT privacy rule violations.
CONCLUSION
The explosive growth of HIT in the healthcare industry and the number of HIPAA
violations reported each year demonstrate a need for healthcare organizations to improve
HIPAA-regulation compliance. Unless changes in regulatory environments and
organizational structures change dramatically for the better, HIPAA violations are likely to
worsen. Fortunately, SIPVHOM offers a way to explain and predict organizational violations
of IT privacy rules, including HIPAA. The model and recommendations presented in this
paper could help to improve regulatory environments and organizational structures by
showing where the deficiencies and vulnerabilities in the current healthcare delivery system
lie.
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APPENDIX A. POTENTIONAL OPERATIONALIZATIONS OF SIPVHOM CONSTRUCTS
Table of Operationalizations for SIPVHOM Constructs
Construct

Subconstruct Code Items

Description

Structural
secrecy

Centralization CEN- Our business transactions with other
1
units should be approved by upper
management?
CEN- Any agreement or dispute over
2
interunit activities should be reported
to upper management and we should
let them settle the issue?
CEN- Upper management has the ultimate
3
power to decide whether or not we
collaborate with other units in the
orgnaization?
Networking
NET- On average, how many days per year
opportunities 1
do you spend in interdepartmental
committees, teams, and task forces?
NET- On average, how many days per year
2
do you spend in interdepartmental
meetings and conferences?
NET- On average, how many days per year
3
do you spend in meetings with upper
management?
Organizational OML- Compared to other healthcare
memory level 1
organizations, my organization has:
A great deal of knowledge about
[insert a particular HIPAA IT rule here
or ask about HIPAA in general]
OML- Compared to other healthcare
2
organizations, my organization has:
A great deal of experience with [insert
a particular HIPAA IT rule here or ask
about HIPAA in general]
OML- Compared to other healthcare
3
organizations, my organization has:
A great deal of familiarity with [insert
a particular HIPAA IT rule here or ask
about HIPAA in general]
OML- Compared to other healthcare
4
organizations, my organization has:
Invested a great deal in measure to
prevent [insert a particular HIPAA IT
rule here or ask about HIPAA in
general]
Organizational OMD- Rate the degree of consensus among
memory
1
administrators with regard to
dispersion
procedures for [insert a particular
HIPAA IT rule]:
OMD- Rate the degree of consensus among
2
doctors with regard to procedures for

Borrowed from (Tsai,
2002).
Rated 1 to 7 (strongly
disagree – strongly agree).

Violation
coupling

Borrowed from (Ghoshal
et al., 1994).

Borrowed from (Moorman
& Miner, 1997).
Rated 1 to 7 (strongly
disagree – strongly agree).

Borrowed from (Moorman
& Miner, 1997).
Rated 1 to 7 (low – high).
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[insert a particular HIPAA IT rule]:
OMD- Rate the degree of consensus among
3
nurses with regard to procedures for
[insert a particular HIPAA IT rule]:
Enforceability Certainty of
sanctions

Severity of
sanctions

Celerity of
sanctions

Procedural
emphasis

Goal clarity

CER- It is routine for our organizations to be
1
audited by Health and Human
Services to identify HIPAA computer
violations.
CER- Organizations that [insert a particular
2
HIPAA IT rule here] will be caught.
CER- It is likely that [insert a particular
3
HIPAA IT rule here] can be traced
back to the violating organization.
SEV- Organizations caught [insert a
1
particular HIPAA IT rule here] will be
severely punished.
SEV- Organizations caught [insert a
2
particular HIPAA IT rule here] will be
reprimanded.
SEV- Organizations caught [insert a
3
particular HIPAA IT rule here] will
face serious consequences.
CEL- For our organization, actions against
1
[insert a particular HIPAA IT rule
here] are immediate.
CEL- For our organization, actions against
2
[insert a particular HIPAA IT rule
here] are instantaneous.
CEL- For our organization, actions against
3
[insert a particular HIPAA IT rule
here] are timely.
GC-1 Procedural emphasis measures could
be
It is clear what outcomes are
expected in the HIPAA rule that
states [insert a particular HIPAA IT
rule here].
GC-2 The information provided on the HHS
website about [insert a particular
HIPAA IT rule here] will help you
protect patient’s medical information.
GC-3 The information provided on the HHS
website about [insert a particular
HIPAA IT rule here] was sufficiently
unambiguous.
GC-4 The information provided to you by
HHS about [insert a particular HIPAA
IT rule here] was sufficiently detailed.

Borrowed from (Qing et al.,
2011). Rated 1 to 7
(strongly disagree –
strongly agree).

Borrowed from (Qing et al.,
2011). Rated 1 to 7
(strongly disagree –
strongly agree).

Borrowed from (Qing et al.,
2011). Rated 1 to 7
(strongly disagree –
strongly agree).

Borrowed from (Tziner et
al., 1993). Rated 1 to 7
(strongly disagree –
strongly agree).
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Rule
Rule density
connectedness

RD-1 As a researcher, select the HIPAA IT
violation of interest and follow the
instructions to the right. It should be
the same rule that you select for the
scenario above.

Perception of Perceived risk PRV- What do you believe is the risk for
risk
of violations
1
your organization due to the
possibility that:
My organization could be issued
severe sanctions for violations of
[insert a particular HIPAA IT rule
here]
PRV- possibility that:
2
The media could damage my
organization’s image by sharing
information about violations of [insert
a particular HIPAA IT rule here]
committed by my organization
PRV- possibility that:
3
My organization will be caught if it
violates [insert a particular HIPAA IT
rule here]
Likelihood of a Misuse intent MI-1 If you were Sam, what is the
rule violation
likelihood that you would have [insert
a particular HIPAA IT rule here]?

MI-2

Borrowed from (Sullivan,
2010).
Calculate the “density” of
rules by tracking, coding,
and aggregating the
following statistics for a
specific time period:
• Gather all rule
proposals and
finalization dates
• Code all rules into
distinct categories
• Code all rules to
indicate whether
they influence
human or
nonhuman factors
• Record finalized
rules as an event,
non-finalized rules
as a non-event
• Code all rule
violation reports
(incident reports)
to identify them as
having either
human or nonhuman causes.
Borrowed from (Dinev &
Hart, 2006).
Rated 1 to 7 (very low risk
– very high risk).
Fill in with the rule
selected for the scenario.

Borrowed from (D'Arcy et
al., 2009).
Rated 1 to 7 (very unlikely
– very likely)
If multiple scenarios are
I could see myself [insert a particular used:
HIPAA IT rule here] if I were in Sam’s MI-1 = MI-1(scenario1) +
…MI-1(scenarion).
situation.
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Moral
commitment

MC-1 It was morally acceptable for Sam to
[insert a particular HIPAA IT rule
here].

Fill in with the rule
selected for the scenario.
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